Towards A New Af-Pak?

President Karzai has said that Afghanistan does not want to be the battleground for proxy wars between India and Pak.

Shrinivasrao S. Sohoni

The walls of the historic Presidential Palace in Kabul this last week echoed the overhead humdrum of helicopters ferrying VVIPS to and fro the airport each day. On Saturday, March 6, 2010 Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, came with minimal prior notice to Kabul and met with President Karzai. On Sunday, March 7, 2010 UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown made a similar visit and call. On Monday, March 8, 2010, came US Defense Secretary, Robert Gates and on Wednesday, March 10, 2010, Iran’s President Ahmednijad followed suit. On Thursday, March 11, 2010 Afghanistan’s President Karzai, reached Islamabad, preceded by a delegation of Ministers from his Cabinet, including the Afghan Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Education, and Commerce, the National Security Advisor and the Director General of the Riyasat Amaniyat-e-Milli (RAM) i.e. Afghanistan’s Directorate of Intelligence; practically the entire nucleus of the government in Afghanistan. President Karzai was received on arrival in Pakistan by almost the entire Pakistani cabinet. Talks were held among others notably again between the Afghan President and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff. A number of memoranda of understanding were signed covering a range of areas for bilateral cooperation. Press coverage of the various interactions include reports of Kayani’s pressing again an offer of military training in Pakistan of Afghan army and security personnel; President Karzai’s statements to the effect that Afghanistan does not want to be the battleground for proxy wars between India and Pakistan, and welcoming Pakistan’s cooperation in initiatives for reconciliation and reintegration of Taliban; the idea of the Afghanistan Peace Jirga followed by an Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace Jirga; and of Afghanistan and Pakistan being “twin brothers”, indeed, “conjoined twins” – the latter term being at once as completely true as it is pithy. (Along with statements underlining the importance of Afghanistan-Pakistan fraternal bonds, the sagacious Afghan President also made it a point to mention ties with India being very close and friendly and graciously acknowledge India’s support to Afghanistan’s nation building activity.) Simultaneous to these developments were statements by British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, underlining the importance of involving Pakistan in the reconciliation and reintegration of Taliban in Afghanistan, and US General Pitreaus’s comment appreciating Pakistan’s military and political concerns relative to Afghanistan, focusing particularly on India’s substantive friendship and cooperation with Afghanistan. Miliband, overriding diplomatic etiquette expected of a minister of foreign affairs referring to the head of state and government of another country, assumed a high moral tone and pronounced that not what the Afghan President says, but what he does, will be the basis for judging him. Whilst Miliband’s comments went largely unnoticed in Afghanistan, US President Barack Obama’s Special Envoy, Richard Holbrookes’ certainly caught wide attention. Holbrooke’s reported assertion that almost every Pashtun family has involvement in Taliban terrorism caused real outrage in Afghanistan, and led to a stinging condemnatory resolution against him in the Afghan Parliament. Holbrooke’s subsequent claim of being quoted out of context and misunderstood did not assuage feelings. Official denials are more often taken as proof of the accuracy of the original statement – the old dictum being: “Never believe an official statement till it has been denied.” The fact of the matter is that despite colossal scale of US and its allies’ expenditure in Afghanistan and military and non-military aid, it is the perception in Afghanistan circles that there is a disturbing degree of confusion and directionlessness in current US-led policy, inconsistencies in the way US diplomatic and aid agencies function, and endemic defects and failures in NATO-led military intervention. These perceptions have contributed to certain basic assessments having a bearing on policy formulation. Foremost is the assessment that the US political and military establishment cannot be relied upon to prove effective in curbing Pakistan’s providing sustenance and safe haven to the Taliban, and therefore its not being able meaningfully to quell Taliban insurgency let alone suppress the terrorist campaign pursued in Afghanistan by Pakistan-based terrorist groups. US accommodation and even endorsement is assumed to continue and indeed become more emphatic, - of Pakistan’s foreign and security policies dictated as these are by General Staff Headquarters in Rawalpindi. The fact is noted that after eight years of military engagement by the world’s only super power and its 42 allies, the terrorism and insurgency that it purports to fight is far from being eliminated and has actually intensified and expanded. And there are certain cognate assessments: i) that national reconstruction in Afghanistan can simply not make any tangible headway so long as a rising incidents of terrorism and insurgency increasingly make life unsafe and uncertain in Afghanistan and even in the country’s capital; ii) there is the prospect of Afghanistan’s being left largely to fend for itself if US forces effect a disengagement from combat configurations as announced; iii) effort will have to be made by the Government of Afghanistan to reach a negotiated settlement with the Pakistan-based armed opposition; iv) Pakistan’s ruling establishment will therefore have to be engaged with, and, to an extent, its demands adjusted with, to secure its substantive support to the process of negotiation – given the fact that the Taliban leaders based in Pakistan are virtually at the mercy of the Pakistani establishment and manipulated by it; v) a nationwide consensus spanning diverse ethnicities needs to be built in Afghanistan, to back the endeavour to negotiate a settlement with the armed opposition, and endorse the modalities to be followed thereto; vi) a peace settlement reached in this way would necessarily entail compromises, including admitting members of the armed opposition into governance structures in lieu of their agreeing to cease hostilities. The proposed Afghanistan Peace Jirga, to be followed by smaller Jirgas (Jirga-gais) an Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace Jirga and the Kabul Conference, are all ideas advised in this context. Pakistan holds many top trumps in this stage of the game. There is understandable exultation in Rawalpindi and Islamabad at the course of events. After all, it is never forgotten that the first ‘A’ in ‘PAKISTAN’, was included by the author of that name (Chaudhary Rahmat Ali, in 1934) - to represent ‘Afghania’, and never since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 has Pakistan appeared to have more leverage, political and kinetic, in Afghanistan; with potential for more of the same. Perhaps these considerations emboldened General Kayani into pressing yet again the offer of military training by Pakistan of Afghan army and security forces – an offer which the visiting Afghan head of State, with his characteristic finesse, said would be examined by his Defence Minister. Pakistan’s respected ‘Daily Times’ of March 13, 2010 had this dry-eyed editorial view: “Talks between Pakistani and Afghan high officials during President Hamid Karzai’s two-day visit to Pakistan could, at best, be described as diplomatic niceties. Given the deep gulf of mistrust and suspicion existing between the alienated neighbors, they do not have any choice but to try to paper over the cracks for the moment, talk like friends, and appear on the same page in front of the media. On the face of it, President Karzai’s talk of the two countries being ‘conjoined twins’ and that he would not allow the Afghan territory to be used against Pakistan gives an impression that all is well, but the fact of the matter is that a large majority of Afghans hold Pakistan responsible for their miseries because of Pakistan’s policy over the last four decades of treating Afghanistan as its backyard under the garb of strategic depth. Not surprisingly then, the Afghans did not respond warmly to Pakistan’s offer of training the Afghan security forces. From their perspective, it would be disastrous to open yet another door for Pakistan to try to maneuver circumstances in the war-ravaged country to Pakistan’s perceived benefit. Despite all this, there is still room for optimism following the latest high level contact between the two neighbors… There are now positive signs that Pakistan has finally come to grips with the reality that without tackling all shades of militant elements, it cannot vanquish the hydra of militancy that has wreaked havoc on the lives of innocent citizens on both sides of the divide.” Such realism and constructive approach is only to be welcomed. The next few months will indicate whether there is indeed a new phase in Af-Pak -- with the prospect of a better future for the region, and whether past experience with General Staff Head Quarters in ’Pindi should encourage hope. Unquestionably, the peace process in Af-Pak is truly a great and historic cause, calling for the contributions of all – in the region and beyond. (The author is a retired IAS officer, currently working as Senior Advisor to the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in Kabul)