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Months before coup, Sharif struck a deal with US to get Osama : The Indian Express
In 1999, the CIA secretly trained and equipped approximately 60 commandos from the ISI to enter Afghanistan for the purpose of capturing or killing Osama bin Laden, according to people familiar with the operation. The operation was arranged by then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his chief of intelligence with the Clinton administration, which in turn promised to lift sanctions on Pakistan and provide an economic aid package.
In 1999, the CIA secretly trained and equipped approximately 60 commandos from the ISI to enter Afghanistan for the purpose of capturing or killing Osama bin Laden, according to people familiar with the operation. The operation was arranged by then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his chief of intelligence with the Clinton administration, which in turn promised to lift sanctions on Pakistan and provide an economic aid package.
The plan was aborted after Sharif’s ouster by Pervez Musharraf and the latter’s refusal to play ball. Ironically, the same Musharraf is the US’s ally in its hunt for the Saudi billionaire.
Set in motion less than 12 months after US cruise missile strikes against Osama’s training camps in Afghanistan, the operation was part of a more determined effort by the US to get Osama than has been previously reported. This included consideration of broader military action, such as massive bombing raids and Special Forces assaults. It is a record of missed opportunities that has provided President George Bush and his administration with some valuable lessons as well as a framework for action as they draw up plans for their own war against Osama and his Al-Qaeda network.
The Pakistani commando team was up and running and ready to strike by October 1999, a former official said. ‘‘It was an enterprise,’’ the official said. ‘‘It was proceeding.’’ Still stung by their failure to get Osama the previous year, Clinton officials were delighted at the operation. ‘‘It was like Christmas,’’ a source said. ‘‘It was a sustained effort,’’ Clinton’s Secretary of Defense William Cohen said recently. ‘‘There was not a week that went by when the issue wasn’t seriously addressed by the national security team.’’ Then national security adviser Sandy Berger said, ‘‘Al-Qaeda and Osama were the number one security threat to America after 1998. It was the highest priority, and a range of appropriate actions were taken.’’
Then came the coup, the accession of Musharraf and his refusal to go along with the plan, despite efforts by the Clinton Administration. The plan died there; never again did definitive information arrive that might have permitted another attempt to get Osama, officials said. ‘‘I can’t tell you how many times we got a call saying, ‘‘We have information, and we have to hold a secret meeting about whether to launch a military action,’ ’’ said Walter Slocombe, the former under secretary of defense for policy. ‘‘Maybe we were too cautious. I don’t think so.’’ The record of the CIA’s aborted relationship with Pakistan two years ago illustrates the value — and the pitfalls — of such an alliance in targeting Osama. Pakistan and its intelligence service have valuable information about what is occurring inside Afghanistan.
The plan was aborted after Sharif’s ouster by Pervez Musharraf and the latter’s refusal to play ball. Ironically, the same Musharraf is the US’s ally in its hunt for the Saudi billionaire.
Set in motion less than 12 months after US cruise missile strikes against Osama’s training camps in Afghanistan, the operation was part of a more determined effort by the US to get Osama than has been previously reported. This included consideration of broader military action, such as massive bombing raids and Special Forces assaults. It is a record of missed opportunities that has provided President George Bush and his administration with some valuable lessons as well as a framework for action as they draw up plans for their own war against Osama and his Al-Qaeda network.
The Pakistani commando team was up and running and ready to strike by October 1999, a former official said. ‘‘It was an enterprise,’’ the official said. ‘‘It was proceeding.’’ Still stung by their failure to get Osama the previous year, Clinton officials were delighted at the operation. ‘‘It was like Christmas,’’ a source said. ‘‘It was a sustained effort,’’ Clinton’s Secretary of Defense William Cohen said recently. ‘‘There was not a week that went by when the issue wasn’t seriously addressed by the national security team.’’ Then national security adviser Sandy Berger said, ‘‘Al-Qaeda and Osama were the number one security threat to America after 1998. It was the highest priority, and a range of appropriate actions were taken.’’
Then came the coup, the accession of Musharraf and his refusal to go along with the plan, despite efforts by the Clinton Administration. The plan died there; never again did definitive information arrive that might have permitted another attempt to get Osama, officials said. ‘‘I can’t tell you how many times we got a call saying, ‘‘We have information, and we have to hold a secret meeting about whether to launch a military action,’ ’’ said Walter Slocombe, the former under secretary of defense for policy. ‘‘Maybe we were too cautious. I don’t think so.’’ The record of the CIA’s aborted relationship with Pakistan two years ago illustrates the value — and the pitfalls — of such an alliance in targeting Osama. Pakistan and its intelligence service have valuable information about what is occurring inside Afghanistan.