Dantewada attack - Raising the threshold

The bloodshed in Chattisgarh`s Dantewada district and the massacre of 76 CRPF troopers has taken India`s fight against Maoists to a new level.

Rijo Jacob Abraham

A leading newspaper headline screamed on April 6, “It’s war: Naxals butcher 74 in worst blow to security forces.” The Dantewada attack is undoubtedly the bloodiest ever, taking the game to a new level. Analyzing reports, it does seem that the media and politicians have come to think that Maoists are waging a full-fledged war aimed at toppling Indian democracy. The prime opposition party, the BJP, rallied behind the UPA, saying it will extend full support to the government if it starts an all-out offensive against the Maoists. Analysts point out that it is the “subliminal” nature of Naxal violence -- its “ability to slip in and out of public conscience” -- that makes it very successful. With the recent attacks, the media has come to think of it as a war, definitely. But has the public? It doesn’t seem so. Seventy-six, the number of dead soldiers in the attack, may not be a number good enough to arouse the public consciousness against Naxals. It is indeed unfortunate that 76 men lost their lives. But what is more unfortunate is that we haven’t learned anything. At best, complacency prevails and at worst the violence threshold has been upped. The Dantewada attacks bring to forefront the government’s anti-Naxal policy which is both fundamentally and strategically flawed. Not only is the very notion of the anti-Naxal narrative of the government wrong, but that this incorrect policy is implemented weakly. It is double-doomed. Strategically flawed—the case of Dantewada The government has made it clear that there won’t be any change in strategy. But there won’t be any call for talks. "To talk of talk now would be a mock at the supreme sacrifice made by 76 jawans,” said Union Home Minister P Chidambaram. The pre-scheduled meeting of National Security Council, which met soon after the attack dwelled on broader infrastructure and on ways to bring about co-operation among different bodies; it discussed the attack as well. Chidambaram has stated that neither the Army nor the Air Force will be used against the Naxals. The Air Chief also reiterated the Home Minister’s claim. The shocked Police and CRPF officers have ordered 40,000 soldiers to enter the forests. But at the ground-level, the troops are rattled. Their morale is down and they are scared to enter the mine-infested forests in Dantakaranya.The media reports, however, are largely focused on assessing the professional competence of the forces. The troops did not adhere to the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or to 48-point guerilla warfare manual. The guidelines prohibit the use of vehicles when moving through the area on foot. The anti-mine vehicle was blown away by a high charge of IED, killing its lone driver. Nor did they take with them SPOs, who were locals. With no knowledge of terrain the CRPF men were sitting ducks. They were also not trained in jungle warfare like other soldiers. Of the 40,000 newly deployed troops (after the attack), only 7,000 are trained in jungle warfare. There is a clear case of the lack of coordination between the central and the state troops. The CoBRA and CRPF according to centre are just assisting the state police. But the issue of who controls the operations comes to forefront here. Though the moral responsibility lies with the Home Minister, there is little clarity on the coordination between the forces on the ground, reports suggest. The police and CRPF officers are in many cases at loggerheads with each other. There was a lot of stress on increasing troop strength from some quarters. While more trained local policemen in the anti-Naxal team could reap rich dividends, an increase in CRPF men with no training in jungle warfare is akin to sending them to a slaughter house. This, especially when there is no dearth of funds for police modernaisation. The Naxals are replying to the anti-Naxal operations by launching TOCC (Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign) to boost the morale of it cadres. Last year it had launched TOCC by February. This is the first round this year if the attack in Koraput in Orissa on April 4, which killed 11 personnel, is not considered. KPS Gill, who led anti-insurgency operations in Punjab said, “The anti-Naxal strategy is a total flop. Somebody has picked up the strategy from a book and forced it on the paramilitary forces, who are obedient and never object to what is thrust on them,” Fundamentally Flawed Ajai Sahni, a counter terrorism expert, calls government strategy as “Rambo Model.” In an interview with a leading fortnightly, he described the “entire nomenclature of this discourse (the anti-Naxal) offensive”—Jharkhand Jaguars, Green Hunt, CoBRAs – as nothing more than fanciful names. Lessons from Punjab and Andhra Pradesh have shown that mass violence can be countered only through an improvement in general policing. Because it is the local police that hold the key for providing local intelligence. With their knowledge of local terrain and grassroots information they are better placed to take on the Maoist outfits. CAG audits show that the state government had spent Rs 205.63 crore against the total outlay of Rs 260.15 crore for modernization of the police force, launched by the Centre on March 30 this year. This means that around 20 percent remains unspent. The state police is also reeling under an acute shortage of weapons. To say this is not to deny the role of special forces. Special forces are needed for targeted, surgical strikes, but they can be effective only in an atmosphere made secure by local police. This would do the spadework to usher in the often talked about socio-economic development in these area. The government doesn’t seem any closer to implementing a complete overhaul of policing or any long-term strategy that would undermine the Naxal menace. The reason is that there are no other political incentives and sadly no public outrage. People’s threshold for tolerance of violence has increased. Varavara Rao, a Naxal ideologue, warned in an interview with a leading news channel that the Home Minister should be careful before issuing statements like the “Naxal movement will be wiped out”. Chidambaram’s rhetoric against Maoists, at a level, seems more of a populist stance, which only serves the purpose of provoking Naxals.