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Dilemma of Deployment
By Geetika Jain With modalities being worked out on the issue of sending Indian troops to Iraq, a final decision is likely to be taken as soon as Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee returns from his China visit. The dilemma faced by Indian decision-makers is grave due to the nature of the assignment, which is entirely different from the earlier peacekeeping missions carried out by Indian forces.
By Geetika Jain
With modalities being worked out on the issue of sending Indian troops to Iraq, a final decision is likely to be taken as soon as Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee returns from his China visit. The dilemma faced by Indian decision-makers is grave due to the nature of the assignment, which is entirely different from the earlier peacekeeping missions carried out by Indian forces.
Will we or won’t we – is the question. The demand is made by the US and not by the UN. That is the bone of contention. Had UN asked India, there might have been no reluctance in giving a nod. But the US has trespassed the UN authority to ask India on its own.
During the US war on Iraq, Indian Parliament passed a resolution calling for an immediate withdrawal of US troops from Iraqi soil. A decision to deploy troops under US aegis would negate the earlier resolution. Almost all Opposition parties in India are raising this objection and are pressurising the government to send Indian troops only under the UN auspices. The Resolution 1483 passed by UN Security Council (UNSC) on May 22 recognises and allows the presence of coalition forces in Iraq for a particular time period but it does not legitimise the war. On the issue of Indian troops in Iraq, UNSC has kept mum. In fact, few newspaper reports suggest that Kofi Annan has “hinted” his disapproval at the presence of Indian troops in Iraq to Yashwant Sinha. Keeping this in view, India certainly faces a daunting task in making a decision.
Lets try and address the basic issues involved.
Why does US want India to send its troops? There are very many reasons for this. Indians are well-accepted not only in Iraq, but also in Iran and Turkey. They can enter Iraq with a friendly approach. This acceptance can help in overcoming the resentment for coalition troops among Iraqis.
There is growing discomfiture within US and Britain following a series of sniper attacks on US troops in Iraq and failure of coalition troops to find any weapons of mass destruction. Hence, US must do something now to reduce the frustration among Iraqis and “friendly” Indian troops can facilitate this.
Indian troops have a commendable track record in peacekeeping missions. They have the capacity to sustain large troop commitments over prolonged period. India has rich experience of dealing with civil strife and has experience in working in a terrain similar to Iraq.
US wants to legitimise its war on Iraq by seeking assistance from the moderate-thinking nations like India.
It might sound insignificant, but it is true that Americo-Euro forces are finding it hard to brave the growing heat in the region. Thus, partial replacement by Indian troops can prove to be a big help.
Why should India send its troops? What is the “national interest” involved?
Indo-US relations are at a very crucial stage, at least from Indian point of view. India is always “thrilled” at the thought of getting closer to the Big Daddy. We feel a decision in their favour may result in substantial gains. We say that we can and will fight against Pak-sponsored terrorism on our own and will resolve the Kashmir issue. The reality is that we also want US to put pressure on our mischievous neighbour. This is the biggest bargain that India is hoping to strike. We help you in Iraq, you help us with Pakistan.
But that would mean missing a point. What happens if Pakistan also sends it troops in aid of US in Iraq. This is great possibility in view of the fact that General Musharraf has already given an indication about the same. We will be left with nothing in the basket.
Besides, it is also true that so far US has never really put enough pressure on Pakistan to stop cross-border infiltration despite its “war on terrorism” after 9/11. Even if Pakistan is pressurised, what happens if Pakistan stalls infiltration for a period of time and then resumes it again? Very importantly, India has to tread very cautiously in involving US in Kashmir. Time and again, India has said that it does not want third party mediation. US would have to be involved to our benefit but in a manner that they do not become a de-facto third party and later we have trouble pushing them off.
Coming back to the “national interest”, India can seize this opportunity to expand its domain politically on the international front. We want a strong strategic footing to augment our security concerns and enhance diplomatic clout. But we may lose our identity in the complex game plan and be just seen as a US subsidiary.
Next, we can hope to draw some share from the multi-billion dollar contracts pie of Iraq reconstruction. Once Indian troops are in place in Iraq and India establishes itself as US ally, we are likely to benefit economically. This is indeed a lucrative proposition.
India has a long-standing demand for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. With Indian troops more active internationally and a chance for India to prove its prowess, that too in favour of US, this can help us in grabbing the sought-after seat with US backing. As of now, there seem to be no promises made.
Technical snags
After we have worked out our move on the strategic chess board, we would have to address some “very real” technical hitches.
Firstly, there is no justification of US war on Iraq as it crushed the UN mandate against war. Our foreign policy has always been in line with the UN. This would be the first breach.
Secondly, the expenditure of placing and maintaining troops in Iraq could run into huge figures. To sustain such huge bills would mean compromising developmental work. At the same time if US bears the cost, we would be reduced to becoming US’ foot soldiers.
Thirdly, our troops are already too busy in counter-insurgency operations in the North-East and Kashmir. Military assistance in Iraq would put additional pressure on an already stretched force.
Fourthly, Indian troops have either worked under their own command or the UN aegis. Iraq could mean reporting to an American General. Strategically it could turn out to be an incorrect decision. It may even affect the morale of the forces.
Lastly, there is no national consensus on sending the troops to Iraq. Any incautious decision on government’s part would be met with strong opposition throughout the country.
Besides, there is another string of questions.
How will we handle the hostile situations in Iraq? How far would the use of force be allowed? Would we be allowed to shoot? Are we ready for Indian casualties? How long would our troops stay over there? What would be the exit strategy? These are the major questions that are yet to be answered. If there has been any discussion with the Pentagon team on these issues, it has not been made public.
All we know is that we asked the Pentagon team to get a UN resolution passed in favour of sending peacekeeping troops.
Ground reality
Post-war Iraq is still in shambles. There is no interim government and restoration of democracy also seems far. Besides the political scene, infrastructure is in bad shape. There is a growing sense of frustration among Iraqis. And an even deeper resentment against the coalition. This may find vent on our troops.
It is likely that the Indian team, in a compromise formula, comprise non-combatant, medicos, engineers, supervisors etc. But even then there is no guarantee that they may not come at receiving end of Iraqi wrath.
Indian policy-makers have to ponder on all this and much more.
All said and done, we must remember that the world today is unilateral. We may feel it is a good idea to be seen in the “right camp”, but then at what cost. We may want to toe the US line, thinking it would serve our strategic and other long-term interests. But do we want to be seen as a simpering nation? Or should the India of the 21st century finally come into her own as a strong, resilient and fiercely independent nation that can voice its opposition at what it feels is wrong? I would opt for the latter.
With modalities being worked out on the issue of sending Indian troops to Iraq, a final decision is likely to be taken as soon as Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee returns from his China visit. The dilemma faced by Indian decision-makers is grave due to the nature of the assignment, which is entirely different from the earlier peacekeeping missions carried out by Indian forces.
Will we or won’t we – is the question. The demand is made by the US and not by the UN. That is the bone of contention. Had UN asked India, there might have been no reluctance in giving a nod. But the US has trespassed the UN authority to ask India on its own.
During the US war on Iraq, Indian Parliament passed a resolution calling for an immediate withdrawal of US troops from Iraqi soil. A decision to deploy troops under US aegis would negate the earlier resolution. Almost all Opposition parties in India are raising this objection and are pressurising the government to send Indian troops only under the UN auspices. The Resolution 1483 passed by UN Security Council (UNSC) on May 22 recognises and allows the presence of coalition forces in Iraq for a particular time period but it does not legitimise the war. On the issue of Indian troops in Iraq, UNSC has kept mum. In fact, few newspaper reports suggest that Kofi Annan has “hinted” his disapproval at the presence of Indian troops in Iraq to Yashwant Sinha. Keeping this in view, India certainly faces a daunting task in making a decision.
Lets try and address the basic issues involved.
Why does US want India to send its troops? There are very many reasons for this. Indians are well-accepted not only in Iraq, but also in Iran and Turkey. They can enter Iraq with a friendly approach. This acceptance can help in overcoming the resentment for coalition troops among Iraqis.
There is growing discomfiture within US and Britain following a series of sniper attacks on US troops in Iraq and failure of coalition troops to find any weapons of mass destruction. Hence, US must do something now to reduce the frustration among Iraqis and “friendly” Indian troops can facilitate this.
Indian troops have a commendable track record in peacekeeping missions. They have the capacity to sustain large troop commitments over prolonged period. India has rich experience of dealing with civil strife and has experience in working in a terrain similar to Iraq.
US wants to legitimise its war on Iraq by seeking assistance from the moderate-thinking nations like India.
It might sound insignificant, but it is true that Americo-Euro forces are finding it hard to brave the growing heat in the region. Thus, partial replacement by Indian troops can prove to be a big help.
Why should India send its troops? What is the “national interest” involved?
Indo-US relations are at a very crucial stage, at least from Indian point of view. India is always “thrilled” at the thought of getting closer to the Big Daddy. We feel a decision in their favour may result in substantial gains. We say that we can and will fight against Pak-sponsored terrorism on our own and will resolve the Kashmir issue. The reality is that we also want US to put pressure on our mischievous neighbour. This is the biggest bargain that India is hoping to strike. We help you in Iraq, you help us with Pakistan.
But that would mean missing a point. What happens if Pakistan also sends it troops in aid of US in Iraq. This is great possibility in view of the fact that General Musharraf has already given an indication about the same. We will be left with nothing in the basket.
Besides, it is also true that so far US has never really put enough pressure on Pakistan to stop cross-border infiltration despite its “war on terrorism” after 9/11. Even if Pakistan is pressurised, what happens if Pakistan stalls infiltration for a period of time and then resumes it again? Very importantly, India has to tread very cautiously in involving US in Kashmir. Time and again, India has said that it does not want third party mediation. US would have to be involved to our benefit but in a manner that they do not become a de-facto third party and later we have trouble pushing them off.
Coming back to the “national interest”, India can seize this opportunity to expand its domain politically on the international front. We want a strong strategic footing to augment our security concerns and enhance diplomatic clout. But we may lose our identity in the complex game plan and be just seen as a US subsidiary.
Next, we can hope to draw some share from the multi-billion dollar contracts pie of Iraq reconstruction. Once Indian troops are in place in Iraq and India establishes itself as US ally, we are likely to benefit economically. This is indeed a lucrative proposition.
India has a long-standing demand for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. With Indian troops more active internationally and a chance for India to prove its prowess, that too in favour of US, this can help us in grabbing the sought-after seat with US backing. As of now, there seem to be no promises made.
Technical snags
After we have worked out our move on the strategic chess board, we would have to address some “very real” technical hitches.
Firstly, there is no justification of US war on Iraq as it crushed the UN mandate against war. Our foreign policy has always been in line with the UN. This would be the first breach.
Secondly, the expenditure of placing and maintaining troops in Iraq could run into huge figures. To sustain such huge bills would mean compromising developmental work. At the same time if US bears the cost, we would be reduced to becoming US’ foot soldiers.
Thirdly, our troops are already too busy in counter-insurgency operations in the North-East and Kashmir. Military assistance in Iraq would put additional pressure on an already stretched force.
Fourthly, Indian troops have either worked under their own command or the UN aegis. Iraq could mean reporting to an American General. Strategically it could turn out to be an incorrect decision. It may even affect the morale of the forces.
Lastly, there is no national consensus on sending the troops to Iraq. Any incautious decision on government’s part would be met with strong opposition throughout the country.
Besides, there is another string of questions.
How will we handle the hostile situations in Iraq? How far would the use of force be allowed? Would we be allowed to shoot? Are we ready for Indian casualties? How long would our troops stay over there? What would be the exit strategy? These are the major questions that are yet to be answered. If there has been any discussion with the Pentagon team on these issues, it has not been made public.
All we know is that we asked the Pentagon team to get a UN resolution passed in favour of sending peacekeeping troops.
Ground reality
Post-war Iraq is still in shambles. There is no interim government and restoration of democracy also seems far. Besides the political scene, infrastructure is in bad shape. There is a growing sense of frustration among Iraqis. And an even deeper resentment against the coalition. This may find vent on our troops.
It is likely that the Indian team, in a compromise formula, comprise non-combatant, medicos, engineers, supervisors etc. But even then there is no guarantee that they may not come at receiving end of Iraqi wrath.
Indian policy-makers have to ponder on all this and much more.
All said and done, we must remember that the world today is unilateral. We may feel it is a good idea to be seen in the “right camp”, but then at what cost. We may want to toe the US line, thinking it would serve our strategic and other long-term interests. But do we want to be seen as a simpering nation? Or should the India of the 21st century finally come into her own as a strong, resilient and fiercely independent nation that can voice its opposition at what it feels is wrong? I would opt for the latter.