By : Raju Santhanam, Executive Editor, Zee News

No magical transformation in Indo-Pak relations is expected when General Pervez Musharraf meets Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee in the middle of July this year. The Kargil intrusions soon after the Lahore peace process cannot be wished away. All the same, for the doves on both sides of the border the summit meeting between the two leaders would at least restart the process of talks, which always has a momentum of its own. But the critical question is are we rushing in for talks with no game-plan in mind? Immediately after the Lahore bus trip, the common refrain from both sides was that at least tensions would ease, but the Kargil war soon after was hardly a tension easing exercise. Nevertheless, the Vajpayee-Musharraf talks had to be started inspite of the fact that both leaders believe that nothing tangible would be achieved. In fact, they are going ahead well aware that one wrong statement from either side could be disastrous for them at home. But peculiar compulsions of both the leaders have forced them to sit across the table.
There is, to my mind, no direct pressure from the United States. In fact, the Bush administration appears to have taken a more hands-off approach towards Indo-Pak ties than the Clinton administration. The General has his own compulsions. Given the tough line of the Bush administration to terrorist groups, Pakistan has to quickly move away from its isolationist image. It has in the past been telling the US that the terrorists are not under its control particularly the Taliban variety and that it has initiated measures to provide informal help to the US to track down Osama bin Laden. The danger of Pakistan being isolated is real. Thanks to American sanctions and the state of its economy, it has been left friendless. But more than that the tough talking, General has now realised that while the tough image may have won him support in Pakistan, it is more important to appear sober in the wake of irresponsible statements made by militants groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba. His recent speech attacking the hard-liners indicates more his frustration than anything else. Significantly, he pointed out that if irresponsible statements continue to emanate from Pakistan, it could be declared a terrorist state.
The General is aware that he needs to be ready to talk to India. His willingness at the same time should not be interpreted as a sign that Pakistan would stop supporting terrorists across the border. In diplomatic terms, this is a positioning exercise. The message to the international community is: Yes, we are not unreasonable. We are prepared to talk across the table.

Vajpayee has his own reasons. Every Indian prime minister has a dream to create history. But, except for Indira Gandhi`s `71 war, when she dismembered Pakistan, few of her successors have achieved anything substantial. Narasimha Rao was hoping he would create history in Ayodhya by tiring out the RSS and the VHP. In the process, his party became history. Vajpayee too has a dream of achieving a breakthrough with Pakistan. Although he is probably the only leader with the credentials to do it, the Kargil war immediately after the Lahore peace process was a jolt. But the Vajpayee dream has not diminished.
This dream is a critical factor in Vajpayee`s invitation to Musharraf, coming as it does when hard-liners in his own party appear to be opposed to any move for talks. This also fits in with foreign minister Jaswant Singh`s global vision of India - to be seen as a reasonable country, always prepared to talk with anyone. As always, there appears to be little planning of what to do in the event of talks boomeranging. This is bound to happen when mandarins at South Block appear more than eager to fulfill Vajpayee’s dream at any cost. It was a telephonic call that prompted the Sharief-Vajpayee meeting in Lahore. No home-work was done at the ground situation. In fact, the Subrahmaniam Committee report actually reveals that most of the preparations for Kargil were effected even as Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharief were hugging each other in Lahore. Expectedly, the Vajpayee dream soon turned into a nightmare in Kargil. Talks between India and Pakistan are unlikely to succeed if sufficient planning is not done. In the past, there have been foreign secretary level talks and even informal contacts, but both sides appear to have not budged in an inch. Could not have some home-work been done before the formal invitation? As of now, Vajpayee’s sudden invitation and Musharraf’s quick response appears to be a point scoring exercise of both sides aimed at the international community.
While these are the compulsions, nothing much can be said about the outcome.
Given the hostility between the two countries, both leaders would be acutely aware of how to package the summit, address hard-liners in their respective countries, and yet give an appearance of emerging "victorious". These are not easy tasks to achieve given the approach of the militant groups in Pakistan and the hard-liners in the VHP, RSS and Sena in this country. It is also difficult because both Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf lack the stature of Indira Gandhi and Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, who in their own ways managed to sell the Simla accord as a victory in their respective countries. The fact is that at least the Indian side has yet to articulate its policy on Kashmir- how far can we go? In informal contacts in the past, there have been near agreements signed on Siachen; but on Kashmir, Pakistan has been adamant on plebiscite. Will Pakistan go on the basis of UN resolutions? Will Kashmir be a core issue for the talks? Will, ultimately, the LoC be accepted as an international border? These are questions for which there are no easy answers. The reason is that neither Pakistan nor India has genuinely done an introspection on Kashmir. What is likely to happen after the summit is predictable. Increased bus services, more trade and the possibility of a movement forward in the oil pipeline deal with Iran are something that the Indians could be satisfied with. But increasingly, General Musharraf, who accused Nawaz Sharief of selling out to India in Lahore, is finding that Pakistan public opinion is fickle and generally jingoistic when it comes to Kashmir and India. He has taken the position that he would be discussing the core issue of Kashmir. But a section of the hardline media is bound to ask why did he go at all if he is coming back empty handed. There is one popular perception in Pakistan that India had no choice but to talk on Kashmir, either because of international pressure or because of increased militants’ pressure on security forces. General Musharraf cannot counter this perception publicly without losing his own popularity. He has, therefore, to hard-sell his own “gain”--A dialogue on the core issue of Kashmir, perhaps the announcement that Army forces would be lessened in Kashmir and a time table for a separate dialogue process for Kashmir talks.
In terms of atmospherics, the hype for the summit would be on expected lines. And since the north Indian psyche usually sets the tone for Indo-Pak exchanges, everyone would cheer the "Jhappi" and "pappi" between Musharraf, "hero" of Kargil in Pakistan, and Vajpayee, the man who was betrayed after Lahore. But ironically, more the hype, more the dangers. And given the domestic pressures of both the leaders at home, even as the doves strive for peace, the hawks on both sides, as in Lahore, could be preparing for another summit-war.