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Preemption: Summer whine?: The Pioneer
New Delhi, Apr 16: Summer in the subcontinent brings with it heat and dust, whipped up from the sand bowls of Thar and Makran. It also stirs embittered passions across the borders. With the snow receding under the merciless glare of a fierce sun, high mountain passes that straddle two nations-India and Pakistan -open up for traffic, mostly military. Abandoned posts on these frontiers are taken over, machine gun nests are set up, mortar and artillery fire positions are taken up and heavy guns mov
New Delhi, Apr 16: Summer in the subcontinent brings with it heat and dust, whipped up from the sand bowls of Thar and Makran. It also stirs embittered passions across the borders. With the snow receding under the merciless glare of a fierce sun, high mountain passes that straddle two nations-India and Pakistan -open up for traffic, mostly military. Abandoned posts on these frontiers are taken over, machine gun nests are set up, mortar and artillery fire positions are taken up and heavy guns move up precipitous inclines to begin what has now become a seasonal summer of conflict. The rhetoric has already reached a shrill height.
This time it was the Indian establishment to get off the block first, taking the American invasion of Iraq as a cover. The term 'preemptive' strike assumed a new meaning for Indian politicians and mandarins. Pakistan is a fit case for a 'preemptive strike'-so said the Ministers. If the US could enter Iraq and take Mr Saddam Hussein out because of a suspicion (unfounded so far) that he stocked chemical and biological munitions, India has more reasons to at least send a few jet fighters screaming into the airspace above Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to take out a few encampments suspected to train and harbour terrorists en route to Kashmir and elsewhere. Caught off-guard this time, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was, however, quick to respond with his characteristic military oratory. He said Pakistan would not sit idle while the Indians planned an attack on his country.
I find this exchange of words silly, futile and dangerous. What exactly is this 'preemptive strike'? If I could presume to put the concept in simple terms, bereft of jargon, 'preemptive strike' would mean an airborne operation (using an aircraft or a missile) tasked to undertake limited, surgical strikes on military/terrorist targets in enemy territory. In principle, it is an attractive proposition. It has immense popular appeal. It is militarily possible. It can be diplomatically justified to the international community. The problem pertains to the imponderables such action may trigger.
The Americans, for instance, have been undertaking all kinds of preemptive strikes against Iraq for years without much success. They had to, in fact, move in with infantry and armoured vehicles to seize Baghdad and throw out Saddam. The Americans have been engaged in preemptive strikes in Afghanistan for more than a year now, also without much success, save the few stray cases where they were able to target abandoned buildings and anonymous vehicles allegedly carrying terrorists. The American airborne preemptive strike strategy has not worked in Afghanistan or Iraq. So those who cite the US action should be a little circumspect about parroting it in public.
There are two other imponderables that are even more critical to such a military action. I call them the border factor and the China factor. The US shares not even a nanometre of border with Iraq or Afghanistan and hence could merrily engage in pre-emptive or surgical strikes across the world without any fear of conventional retaliation. The only retaliations that American policymakers expect and fear are the ones like the September 11 attack: An asymmetrical response.
This is not the case with India and Pakistan. Both countries share a border that stretches across 3,310 kilometres along four Indian States and two Pakistani Provinces. A preemptive strike could be met with a similar response either on a limited scale or across the border. The initiative for the second strike would then rest with the defending power.
Pakistan's immediate gain would be two-fold. Diplomatically, it would label India as an aggressor and reserve the right to respond. This would give General Musharraf a much-needed breather, and a rope trick with which to manipulate the international community to his side while-at the same time-shutting up the rising crescendo of protest against his regime within the country.
Militarily, the gambit has more imponderables than benefits. Before engaging in a preemptive strike, India will have to make sure that it is ready for a fullscale war. It would be suicidal to plan otherwise. Not only should India be prepared to defend its borders but also take the opportunity, in case of a Pakistani attack or retaliation, to strike an offensive posture and ride across the borders.
I think we should give up looking for a middle path. There is no middle path in war. Every war should have a mission objective and should plan to achieve it without much loss of time and life. There is no point in sending a few Mirages to bomb a few empty camps in order to start beating the drum back home to a war dance. The enemy should be made to fear retribution in case it plans a retaliation. Else we should hold our fire and find better ways of handling Islamabad.
Thinktanks and policy heads have always rustled up ad hoc plans-that has been our lot since Independence. Fifty-six years down the line, we still do not have a policy on how to deal with Pakistan. Hence, before endorsing stale ad hocism, it would be prudent for us to look at the China factor. It is an important element and, in some ways, quite a critical factor. China too squats on a fairly long border area, most of it disputed and seemingly unresolvable. Although relations with China are not bitter, it is a touch-and-go situation considering Beijing's geo-strategic ambitions in the region. India is the only possible threat to its supremacy.
Beijing's relation with Islamabad is not a secret either. Both have a relationship that is mutually beneficial and hence growing with an alarming pace every year. China has been increasing its economic association with Pakistan with as much alacrity as it is pushing ahead with extensive defence cooperation. Diplomatic and military dependence-China wants Pakistan to step into Central Asia and Pakistan wants a big brother in the neighbourhood willing to supply weapons -bind them together further.
This is no ordinary relationship. Pakistan has relied on China being on its side whenever the international community, especially the US, has tried to lean heavily on it. It has also been consulting the Chinese on diplomatic and military matters quite extensively. The Kargil war of 1999 is a case in point. General Musharraf-only a Chief of Army Staff at the time-was sitting pretty in a Beijing hotel when his commanders were executing his plan to occupy the heights of Kargil. In fact, the Chinese too showed solidarity with his action by making provocative moves in the Aksai Chin area bordering Leh. The intelligence community reported sporadic but sudden movement of troops and heavy artillery guns in the area, forcing India to put its troops on the northeastern flank on high alert.
During every domestic or international crisis, Pakistani leaders, especially General Musharraf, has been quick to either place a call to Beijing or make a flying visit to confer with the Chinese leaders. During the Iraq crisis, he cleverly decided to send his confidante, Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, to pay the customary visit to Beijing. According to reports, the latter told the Chinese leaders about Pakistan's stand on Iraq and its equation with the US. Several defence deals were also discussed. In fact, the Chinese are more keen than ever before to pursue military cooperation with Pakistan.
It is not very difficult to see why the preemptive strike concept is fraught with dangers-indeed, it comes with suicidal imponderables for the nation's security. There has to be a better and more forceful way to deal with Pakistan. First, there has to be a Pakistan Doctrine: Is it a friend or a foe? Once this is decided, let us stick to the policy and not flip flop between a friendship-filled bus and a missile launch.
Bureau Report
This time it was the Indian establishment to get off the block first, taking the American invasion of Iraq as a cover. The term 'preemptive' strike assumed a new meaning for Indian politicians and mandarins. Pakistan is a fit case for a 'preemptive strike'-so said the Ministers. If the US could enter Iraq and take Mr Saddam Hussein out because of a suspicion (unfounded so far) that he stocked chemical and biological munitions, India has more reasons to at least send a few jet fighters screaming into the airspace above Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to take out a few encampments suspected to train and harbour terrorists en route to Kashmir and elsewhere. Caught off-guard this time, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was, however, quick to respond with his characteristic military oratory. He said Pakistan would not sit idle while the Indians planned an attack on his country.
I find this exchange of words silly, futile and dangerous. What exactly is this 'preemptive strike'? If I could presume to put the concept in simple terms, bereft of jargon, 'preemptive strike' would mean an airborne operation (using an aircraft or a missile) tasked to undertake limited, surgical strikes on military/terrorist targets in enemy territory. In principle, it is an attractive proposition. It has immense popular appeal. It is militarily possible. It can be diplomatically justified to the international community. The problem pertains to the imponderables such action may trigger.
The Americans, for instance, have been undertaking all kinds of preemptive strikes against Iraq for years without much success. They had to, in fact, move in with infantry and armoured vehicles to seize Baghdad and throw out Saddam. The Americans have been engaged in preemptive strikes in Afghanistan for more than a year now, also without much success, save the few stray cases where they were able to target abandoned buildings and anonymous vehicles allegedly carrying terrorists. The American airborne preemptive strike strategy has not worked in Afghanistan or Iraq. So those who cite the US action should be a little circumspect about parroting it in public.
There are two other imponderables that are even more critical to such a military action. I call them the border factor and the China factor. The US shares not even a nanometre of border with Iraq or Afghanistan and hence could merrily engage in pre-emptive or surgical strikes across the world without any fear of conventional retaliation. The only retaliations that American policymakers expect and fear are the ones like the September 11 attack: An asymmetrical response.
This is not the case with India and Pakistan. Both countries share a border that stretches across 3,310 kilometres along four Indian States and two Pakistani Provinces. A preemptive strike could be met with a similar response either on a limited scale or across the border. The initiative for the second strike would then rest with the defending power.
Pakistan's immediate gain would be two-fold. Diplomatically, it would label India as an aggressor and reserve the right to respond. This would give General Musharraf a much-needed breather, and a rope trick with which to manipulate the international community to his side while-at the same time-shutting up the rising crescendo of protest against his regime within the country.
Militarily, the gambit has more imponderables than benefits. Before engaging in a preemptive strike, India will have to make sure that it is ready for a fullscale war. It would be suicidal to plan otherwise. Not only should India be prepared to defend its borders but also take the opportunity, in case of a Pakistani attack or retaliation, to strike an offensive posture and ride across the borders.
I think we should give up looking for a middle path. There is no middle path in war. Every war should have a mission objective and should plan to achieve it without much loss of time and life. There is no point in sending a few Mirages to bomb a few empty camps in order to start beating the drum back home to a war dance. The enemy should be made to fear retribution in case it plans a retaliation. Else we should hold our fire and find better ways of handling Islamabad.
Thinktanks and policy heads have always rustled up ad hoc plans-that has been our lot since Independence. Fifty-six years down the line, we still do not have a policy on how to deal with Pakistan. Hence, before endorsing stale ad hocism, it would be prudent for us to look at the China factor. It is an important element and, in some ways, quite a critical factor. China too squats on a fairly long border area, most of it disputed and seemingly unresolvable. Although relations with China are not bitter, it is a touch-and-go situation considering Beijing's geo-strategic ambitions in the region. India is the only possible threat to its supremacy.
Beijing's relation with Islamabad is not a secret either. Both have a relationship that is mutually beneficial and hence growing with an alarming pace every year. China has been increasing its economic association with Pakistan with as much alacrity as it is pushing ahead with extensive defence cooperation. Diplomatic and military dependence-China wants Pakistan to step into Central Asia and Pakistan wants a big brother in the neighbourhood willing to supply weapons -bind them together further.
This is no ordinary relationship. Pakistan has relied on China being on its side whenever the international community, especially the US, has tried to lean heavily on it. It has also been consulting the Chinese on diplomatic and military matters quite extensively. The Kargil war of 1999 is a case in point. General Musharraf-only a Chief of Army Staff at the time-was sitting pretty in a Beijing hotel when his commanders were executing his plan to occupy the heights of Kargil. In fact, the Chinese too showed solidarity with his action by making provocative moves in the Aksai Chin area bordering Leh. The intelligence community reported sporadic but sudden movement of troops and heavy artillery guns in the area, forcing India to put its troops on the northeastern flank on high alert.
During every domestic or international crisis, Pakistani leaders, especially General Musharraf, has been quick to either place a call to Beijing or make a flying visit to confer with the Chinese leaders. During the Iraq crisis, he cleverly decided to send his confidante, Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, to pay the customary visit to Beijing. According to reports, the latter told the Chinese leaders about Pakistan's stand on Iraq and its equation with the US. Several defence deals were also discussed. In fact, the Chinese are more keen than ever before to pursue military cooperation with Pakistan.
It is not very difficult to see why the preemptive strike concept is fraught with dangers-indeed, it comes with suicidal imponderables for the nation's security. There has to be a better and more forceful way to deal with Pakistan. First, there has to be a Pakistan Doctrine: Is it a friend or a foe? Once this is decided, let us stick to the policy and not flip flop between a friendship-filled bus and a missile launch.
Bureau Report