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The big, the small and the not-so-small: The Hindu
New Delhi, Feb 01: The insatiable appetite of leaders to be kings or king-makers and the reduced vote share of the Congress and the BJP provide the context within which the politics of alliance has to work itself out.
New Delhi, Feb 01: The insatiable appetite of leaders to be kings or king-makers and the reduced vote share of the Congress and the BJP provide the context within which the politics of alliance has to work itself out.
First, A bit of tautology. Coalitions have become inevitable because no single party is able to win a parliamentary majority on its own. There was a time when the Congress could walk away with a majority of the Lok Sabha seats without winning (except once, in 1984) a majority of the popular vote in the country. It won the first four national elections — from 1952 to 1967 — primarily because it operated, mostly, as a coalition by itself; it seemed to have perfected the art of political accommodation, providing a place under the sun to the ambitious and the aspiring — no social group or category was untouchable. It began to lose touch when, in the 1971 election, it imposed a "national" format on the polls and that, in turn, made the party disproportionately dependent on one "charismatic" leader.
As the Congress became one-leader-centric party, it was no longer deemed hospitable to those who were impatient with the status quo, political and economic. The "leader"-centric aberrations, attitudes and absurdities overwhelmed the Congress' institutionalised capacity to provide and sustain the core of centrist politics.
The result was the fragmentation of the national polity and the rise of "regional" parties. For instance in 1989, the national parties had among them nearly 80 per cent of the total votes; this vote share came down to 67 per cent in the 1999 Lok Sabha election. By contrast, the regional parties which accounted for only 9.28 per cent of the national vote in 1989, ended up notching as much as 26.93 per cent in 1999. The regional parties' tally in the Lok Sabha seats was even more impressive; in 1989, they had only 27 seats but in the 1999 election, this figure rose to a decisive 158 seats, capable of making a difference between majority and minority.
After the 1989 Lok Sabha election, when the Congress failed to win a majority (though it remained the largest party), the non-Congress political parties discovered the joy of putting together a post-election alliance. In 1996, it was the turn of the non-BJP parties to come together to keep the BJP out of power. The H.D. Deve Gowda and then the I.K. Gujral experiments added a new dimension to the calculus of fragmentation: every leader, national or regional, began to dream of becoming the Prime Minister of this vast continental polity.
These two factors — the insatiable appetite of leaders to be kings or king-makers and the reduced vote share of two principal parties, the Congress and the BJP — provide the context within which the politics of alliance has to work itself out. Since 1999, the Vajpayee-led National Democratic Alliance has provided the coalitions-are-inevitable theme as the overarching myth that legitimises any kind of power-sharing arrangement. Questions of morality or principles are not asked; only expediency matters. Pre-poll alliances can be effectively put together only by national parties which must undertake the concomitant commitment of not using potential incumbency to expand at the expense of alliance partner(s).
The BJP's aged leadership is in such a tearing hurry to stay in power that it has put a moratorium on its own growth; consequently, even after five years in power, the party cannot hope to improve upon its present tally of 184 seats, thereby choosing to stay dependent on junior alliance partners and remaining subject to their unwholesome demands and tantrums. The Congress, on the other hand, is still very much cognisant of its nationwide presence and has been reluctant to enter into any such undertaking.
It is, however, an entirely understandable endeavour of the national parties to want to impose Grand National themes on this fragmented polity. On the other hand, the national parties, especially the BJP and the Congress, are incapable of registering a nationwide presence. Both suffer from deep organisational disarray; the Congress organisational decay has become more pronounced in the last five years as the party has come to believe that Sonia Gandhi's presumed charisma is all that the party needs to win votes. The BJP has willingly stayed its hand in areas it considers outside its sphere of influence. This leaves the field open for the non-BJP, non-Congress parties to attend to issues involving local pains, problems, protests, paucities and privileges. Moreover, the two national parties have decided to look to a different constituency for approval and applause — the World Bank, the IMF, the NRIs, the White House — rather than pay heed to the internal voices of dissatisfaction.
The two national parties are thus rendered structurally and conceptually under-equipped to regain the national space and dominance.
At the same time, the logic of democratic empowerment gets renewed in each successive electoral contest and consequently the polity finds itself having to work with an ever-increasing number of small parties. When all is said and done, politics remains the most potent instrument of upward social mobility and the voter/citizen is quite willing to support any "sectarian" outfit that is prepared to attend to "narrow" needs and desires.
Yet the communication explosion of the last decade does enable the national parties to impose a nationwide "stage" on an otherwise dispersed and disconnected audience; the emergence of a new middle class also facilitates formulation of this "national mood". The old technique of projecting one leader as prime ministerial candidate has come to be seen as a standard requirement in the new situation. The enduring myth is that a Vajpayee could make a difference of three or four per cent in the fortunes of the alliance's candidates.
Nonetheless, politics remains a localised affair; it is the locally-inspired grievances, the locally-nurtured aspirations and dreams, and the locally-instigated animosities that get worked up during the electoral competition and get channelled into support for this or that political party. As it is, the Lok Sabha elections are becoming more and more competitive.
For instance, in the 1999 election, as many as 84 seats were won or lost by less than two per cent margin, and as many as 104 by a margin that varied from two to five per cent. The other way to look at this competitiveness is that whereas in 1989 as many as 157 seats were won by a margin of more than 20 per cent, 10 years later the figure came down to 71 seats. Simply put, it means that the small parties and smaller players are becoming critical to the fortunes of the national parties. If the big parties have to aggregate a winning margin of 34-35 per cent in each Lok Sabha constituency, then they have to enter into alliance agreements with "small players".
No section is too small to be overlooked. Unless there is a national wave, local issues, local leaders and localised energy cannot be ignored.
Alliances become the instrument for forging new social and political partnerships; and, in the process, the democratic sentiment and its ennobling virtues get deepened at the local level.
As the Congress became one-leader-centric party, it was no longer deemed hospitable to those who were impatient with the status quo, political and economic. The "leader"-centric aberrations, attitudes and absurdities overwhelmed the Congress' institutionalised capacity to provide and sustain the core of centrist politics.
The result was the fragmentation of the national polity and the rise of "regional" parties. For instance in 1989, the national parties had among them nearly 80 per cent of the total votes; this vote share came down to 67 per cent in the 1999 Lok Sabha election. By contrast, the regional parties which accounted for only 9.28 per cent of the national vote in 1989, ended up notching as much as 26.93 per cent in 1999. The regional parties' tally in the Lok Sabha seats was even more impressive; in 1989, they had only 27 seats but in the 1999 election, this figure rose to a decisive 158 seats, capable of making a difference between majority and minority.
After the 1989 Lok Sabha election, when the Congress failed to win a majority (though it remained the largest party), the non-Congress political parties discovered the joy of putting together a post-election alliance. In 1996, it was the turn of the non-BJP parties to come together to keep the BJP out of power. The H.D. Deve Gowda and then the I.K. Gujral experiments added a new dimension to the calculus of fragmentation: every leader, national or regional, began to dream of becoming the Prime Minister of this vast continental polity.
These two factors — the insatiable appetite of leaders to be kings or king-makers and the reduced vote share of two principal parties, the Congress and the BJP — provide the context within which the politics of alliance has to work itself out. Since 1999, the Vajpayee-led National Democratic Alliance has provided the coalitions-are-inevitable theme as the overarching myth that legitimises any kind of power-sharing arrangement. Questions of morality or principles are not asked; only expediency matters. Pre-poll alliances can be effectively put together only by national parties which must undertake the concomitant commitment of not using potential incumbency to expand at the expense of alliance partner(s).
The BJP's aged leadership is in such a tearing hurry to stay in power that it has put a moratorium on its own growth; consequently, even after five years in power, the party cannot hope to improve upon its present tally of 184 seats, thereby choosing to stay dependent on junior alliance partners and remaining subject to their unwholesome demands and tantrums. The Congress, on the other hand, is still very much cognisant of its nationwide presence and has been reluctant to enter into any such undertaking.
It is, however, an entirely understandable endeavour of the national parties to want to impose Grand National themes on this fragmented polity. On the other hand, the national parties, especially the BJP and the Congress, are incapable of registering a nationwide presence. Both suffer from deep organisational disarray; the Congress organisational decay has become more pronounced in the last five years as the party has come to believe that Sonia Gandhi's presumed charisma is all that the party needs to win votes. The BJP has willingly stayed its hand in areas it considers outside its sphere of influence. This leaves the field open for the non-BJP, non-Congress parties to attend to issues involving local pains, problems, protests, paucities and privileges. Moreover, the two national parties have decided to look to a different constituency for approval and applause — the World Bank, the IMF, the NRIs, the White House — rather than pay heed to the internal voices of dissatisfaction.
The two national parties are thus rendered structurally and conceptually under-equipped to regain the national space and dominance.
At the same time, the logic of democratic empowerment gets renewed in each successive electoral contest and consequently the polity finds itself having to work with an ever-increasing number of small parties. When all is said and done, politics remains the most potent instrument of upward social mobility and the voter/citizen is quite willing to support any "sectarian" outfit that is prepared to attend to "narrow" needs and desires.
Yet the communication explosion of the last decade does enable the national parties to impose a nationwide "stage" on an otherwise dispersed and disconnected audience; the emergence of a new middle class also facilitates formulation of this "national mood". The old technique of projecting one leader as prime ministerial candidate has come to be seen as a standard requirement in the new situation. The enduring myth is that a Vajpayee could make a difference of three or four per cent in the fortunes of the alliance's candidates.
Nonetheless, politics remains a localised affair; it is the locally-inspired grievances, the locally-nurtured aspirations and dreams, and the locally-instigated animosities that get worked up during the electoral competition and get channelled into support for this or that political party. As it is, the Lok Sabha elections are becoming more and more competitive.
For instance, in the 1999 election, as many as 84 seats were won or lost by less than two per cent margin, and as many as 104 by a margin that varied from two to five per cent. The other way to look at this competitiveness is that whereas in 1989 as many as 157 seats were won by a margin of more than 20 per cent, 10 years later the figure came down to 71 seats. Simply put, it means that the small parties and smaller players are becoming critical to the fortunes of the national parties. If the big parties have to aggregate a winning margin of 34-35 per cent in each Lok Sabha constituency, then they have to enter into alliance agreements with "small players".
No section is too small to be overlooked. Unless there is a national wave, local issues, local leaders and localised energy cannot be ignored.
Alliances become the instrument for forging new social and political partnerships; and, in the process, the democratic sentiment and its ennobling virtues get deepened at the local level.