If anything has signified that the flickering embers of the strategic structure which characterised the Cold War have finally been extinguished, it is the treatment accorded to US Secretary of State Colin Powell at the hands of the UN Security Council, by America’s traditional NATO allies, Germany and France, and by its two post-Cold War great-power ‘‘friends’’, Russia and China. Their unwillingness to short-circuit the inspection process and participate in a pre-emptive juggernaut against Iraq has effectively left the world’s only superpower diplomatically isolated as perhaps never before since World War II. Clearly, this is a foreign policy fiasco of enormous proportions. A February 12th speech by elder statesman, Robert Byrd, before the US Senate aptly characterised the situation: ‘‘This administration has turned the patient art of diplomacy into threats and name calling... which will have consequences for years to come... There are huge cracks in our time-honoured alliances, and US intentions are suddenly subject to damaging worldwide mistrust.’’
There is an axiom in physics which states that ‘‘nature abhors a vacuum’’. It applies in international politics as well. In this case, the vacuum has arisen following the demise of the bipolar structure of power that facilitated a stable, if at times tremulous, political balance in the international arena for nearly half a century. Call it a ‘‘balance of terror’’, if you will, managed by the two superpowers — the Soviet Union and the US — but it kept in line a host of political lesser-lights, who might have disrupted the status quo. Their dominance left no vacuums into which potential trouble-makers could rush and challenge the all-encompassing power structure.
During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union were most of the time able to discipline their subalterns because en bloc collective security was deemed to be the only alternative to obliteration. Yes, there were exceptions, like Charles de Gaulle within the Western Bloc, and Tito and Mao Zedong within the Eastern. But the perils of carrying dissidence too far were never lost.
Generally speaking, it is understood that the ‘‘good old days’’ ended with the collapse of the Soviet imperium. A ‘‘uni-centric’’ structure of power has taken its place, based upon the political and military paramountcy of the US, the last remaining superpower. What many in the present US administration are having trouble coping with, however, is the irony of the situation — that political omnipotence does not guarantee absolute military and economic supremacy. The new configuration is actually far more loosely integrated, or ‘‘pluralistic’’, than was its predecessor. As a result, interdependence has become a greater, rather than a lesser, aspect of how strategic relationships must be formulated and managed. Two superpowers could control events better than one, as long as they strategically understood one another. The unfolding events make it clear that superpowerdom in itself does not enable the solitary superpower at the top of the pyramid to bully subalterns with the same degree of equanimity as a superpower dyad could.



The sole remaining superpower, in short, finds that it has limited capacity to manage the multilateral complexity that is now out there. Secretary of State Powell and President Bush are learning this lesson the hard way even as we speak. Technically, the US may have the physical wherewithal to annihilate anyone who stands in its way. Iraq would not last long against the full measure of American military might. Nor would any other state that elected to directly challenge it. But the constraints on employing this might are no less compelling than was the threat of mutually assured destruction during the Cold War. In many respects, they are actually more. Because now the constraints are as much moral as tactical.



In the absence of the ‘‘threat factor’’ posed by a rival superpower, the US has found it impossible either to compel ‘‘obedience’’ to its policies by alliance partners, nor subservience to them by states that have other reasons for being beholden to the American condominium. There are no longer penalties credible enough to deter dissidence since ultimate force has been morally excluded from the power equation.



The Germans and French are leading the pack in their defiance of American dictates. The Chinese, Russians, Saudis, Egyptians, Pakistanis are standing aloof from the American crusade. India is mum. Their resistance has compelled the US to puckishly turn its case over to the UN and other deliberative forums where it is hoped that persuasion will turn the tide.



As C. Raja Mohan said in The Hindu (Feb 13), ‘‘Alliances are built on shared threat perceptions and a commitment to fight them collectively.’’ Unfortunately, however, ‘‘the US and key European players no longer agree that they have a common threat, therefore they find it impossible to deal with them together.’’ All that is left is consensual politics which the world’s last superpower finds discomfiting. This emergent political fact of life is proving hard for the Bush administration to grasp because superpowerdom is such an exhilarating aphrodisiac. If you are the only 600 pound gorilla on the block, then it’s easy to feel you have an unlimited right to throw your weight around. In the arcane world of multilateral global politics, it is exasperating to discover that muscle power alone fails to get you everything!



As already suggested, in the emergent post-Cold War international system, viable moral constraints on the carte blanche exercise of military power mean that now there are many enclaves of regional power able to act autonomously without fear of decisive US retaliation. In part, of course, this is because governments want to make it clear that their sovereignty matters ; that they don’t want to be intimidated by 600 pound gorillas. It is also becoming increasingly clear that in this brave new world, collective dissidence in the morally constrained, multilateral environment of unicentric politics can effectively limit and restrain American superpowerdom. The informal French-German-Belgian-Russian-Chinese coalition that is currently dominating the UN debate on what to do about Iraq well illustrates this point.



Moreover, the nuclear sabre-rattling of North Korea introduces still another crucial variable. It shows that counter-threats of such magnitude can be mounted that there is not much the US can do about it except agree to bargain under conditions that amount to virtual political blackmail.



Finally, Turkey is demonstrating that the limitations inherent in the new unipolar structure of world power can compel the sole remaining superpower to pay a very high premium in treasure and political deference to persuade anyone to agree to join its camp.



What must the US do to restore its prestige and authority so that it does not comport itself, as today, like a petulant, crippled giant? First, it must accept the fact that its rise to exclusive superpowerdom has made the world more rather than less interdependent; more rather than less hostage to dialogue and consensus. The safety and survival of the world community has more than ever come to depend on how rapidly and effectively the US, the last remaining superpower, can acquire the maturity and self-discipline to craft political and military policies that are sensitive, even deferential, to the interests of all segments of the international community. This is a tall order for the world’s 600 pound gorilla, but the only one that will demonstrate US’ entitlement to lead.


Bureau Report